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Abstract
We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal
cost compete a’ la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand,
we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer and producer surplus that can arise
from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness
to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer
surplus, producer surplus and deadweight loss.
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1 Introduction
Antoine Augustin Cournot’s pioneering mathematical analysis of monopoly and oligopoly, published
in his Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie des Richesses (1834), has had an
enormous influence in economics.1 Cournot’s model has been a building block for a large number
of seminal works in a variety of fields, including international trade (e.g., Brander and Krugman
(1983), Atkeson and Burstein (2008)) the study of market power in macroeconomics (Hart (1982))
and industrial organization (Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Berry (1992)) and antitrust merger policy
(Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). After nearly two hundred years, countless papers have explored and
extended Cournot’s work, which remains a benchmark for theories of price formation in the absence
of perfect competition (Vives (1989, 1999)).
In this paper we advance the existing literature, by characterizing all equilibrium outcomes
(i.e., triples of consumer surplus, producer surplus and dead-weight loss) that can possibly arise from
arbitrary demand functions with given first-best surplus in oligopolistic markets with competition
a’ la Cournot — including monopoly as a special case. One main assumption is maintained: firms
have an identical and constant marginal cost.
Suppose marginal cost of production is zero and there is a unit mass of consumers. Then,
the first best surplus of a demand function, let’s denoted it with s, is the average willingness to pay
of consumers. Let’s represent market outcomes as points on the positive quadrant of a Cartesian
plane, with profits npi (n is the number of competing firms) on the x-axis and consumer surplus, w,
on the y-axis. Feasible outcomes satisfy npi+w ≤ s, and deadweight loss is s−w−npi. As we show
in Propositions 2-4, the set of achievable market outcomes is roughly characterized by the triangle
described by the points (npis, s − npis), (npis, 0), (s, 0), with pis ≤ pis.2 For illustration see Figure 5
at the end of the paper. Remarkably, among all equilibria of all possible demand functions, the
one that maximizes consumer surplus is efficient and also minimizes industry profit. Moreover, as
n→∞ then npis → 0 and npis → s. Hence, the achievable set converges to the Pareto frontier.
The only-if part of our proofs are constructive, in the sense that for each achievable market
outcome (i.e., triple of consumer surplus, producer and loss) we present an (inverse) demand func-
tion and a symmetric oligopoly equilibrium quantity that attains it. In particular, our construction
relies on a set of demand functions that, in equilibrium, induce a unit-elastic residual demand,
leaving firms indifferent between playing equilibrium and producing alternative quantities.
Beyond having theoretical interest, obtaining bounds to market outcomes can be useful for
a variety of applied purposes. For instance, our results can inform cost-benefit analysis of altering
the competitive landscape in cases where good estimates of the demand curve are not available.
What’s the best case for consumers if a monopoly is introduced in a certain product market? What
is the worst case scenario following a merger or a policy that reduces the number of competitors?
These are some of the questions whose answers can be informed by our results.
Three papers are most closely related. First, Condorelli and Szentes (2020) identify the
highest level of consumer surplus attainable in a monopolistic market, assuming (inverse) demand
exhibits a given mean consumer value. The maximum consumer surplus is attained when the
demand is unit-elastic and the price is such that all consumers are served. Second, as shown in
1Treatment of those subjects remains almost unchanged to this day, to the point that contemporary economics
students would hardly notice if excerpts from the Recherches were to appear in textbooks.
2This description is not precise as for pis < pi
s the line connecting (npis, s− npis) to (npis, 0) need not be straight.
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Neeman (2003) and Kremer and Snyder (2018), it turns out that said unit-elastic demand also
generates the minimum monopolist profit. Taken together, these results fully characterize the
couples of producer and consumer surplus achievable in a monopoly market with given average
consumer value. In our paper, we generalize this characterization to the case of an arbitrary
number of firms competing a’ la Cournot.
There is a small literature that seek to identify bounds on market outcomes in Cournot
oligopoly, based on specific properties of demand functions.3 Anderson and Renault (2003) derive
bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus based on the
degree of curvature of the (inverse) demand function. They show that the “more concave” is the
demand, the larger the share of producer surplus to overall surplus and the smaller is the consumer
surplus relative to producer surplus. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) establish a 2/3 lower bound on the
ratio between the sum of consumer and producer surplus and first-best surplus, when the (inverse)
demand function is affine and firms are heterogeneous, with their cost function convex. Tsitsiklis
and Xu (2014) extend the previous paper by providing smaller lower bounds for general convex
(inverse) demand. Moreover, they show that arbitrary high efficiency losses are possible if demand
is allowed to be concave. In contrast to these papers, our bounds do not rely on knowledge about
the curvature of the demand function. Also, we obtain a complete characterization of all consumer
and producer surplus couples for any given first-best surplus. However, we only focus on the case
where firms are symmetric and their cost function is linear.
The paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model, we study the case where
demand functions are bounded but there is no restriction on first-best surplus. In section 4, which
contains the main results of this paper, we impose the additional restriction on the first-best surplus.
2 Model
A market is populated by n ∈ N+ firms, all supplying an homogeneous good at common marginal
cost c ∈ (0,+∞). Firms compete a’ la Cournot: each firm i decides the quantity qi ∈ [0,+∞) that
it brings to the market and a non-negative price is determined by the market-clearing condition.
In particular, let P : [0,∞) → <+ be a non-negative, left-continuous and non-increasing inverse
demand curve faced by the firms. If Q =
∑
i qi is the total supply, then the market price is P (Q),
firm i’s profit is (P (Q)− c)qi and consumer surplus is
∫ Q
0 P (x)dx−QP (Q).
In this analysis, we maintain that firms are identical and, without loss of generality, we focus
on symmetric equilibria, where all firms produce the same quantity.4 We say that (q, . . . , q) is a
symmetric Cournot equilibrium of P if
q = arg max
x≥0
[P ((n− 1)q + x)x− cx] ,
and in this case we write q ∈ E(P ). Moreover, we denote with CS(P, q) the consumer surplus and
with Π(P, q) the profit of each firm in an equilibrium q of P .
3A related problem, explored in Carvajal et al. (2013), consists in identifying revealed preference tests for Cournot
equilibrium.
4We show in Appendix A that for any asymmetric equilibrium there exists a symmetric one where the same total
quantity produced is the same. Hence, consumer surplus and total industry profit are the same in the two equilibria.
3
In addition, we require that u = sup{P (Q) | Q ∈ <+} ∈ (c,∞) (i.e., the maximal consumer
valuation, denoted u, is above cost and it is finite) and b = sup{Q | P (Q) ≥ 0} ∈ (0,∞) (i.e., the
maximal demand, b, is positive and finite). Omitting reference to b and u, let P be the set of all
inverse demand functions that satisfy our restrictions.5
Next, let pi = b(u − c)/n and observe that this is the maximum profit that can be made by
a single firm in a symmetric equilibrium for a demand in P, since the maximum price is u while
the maximum quantity is b. Also, let q(pi) = pi/(u− c), or for short simply q when the profit level
is unambiguous, be the individual production that delivers profit pi when the price is u. In other
words, q(pi) is the minimal quantity that is able to deliver individual profit pi for demands in P
3 Bounding Consumer and Producer Surplus
The following family of demand functions in P plays a key role in the analysis that follows. For
each pi ∈ [0, p¯i] and q ∈ [q(pi), b/n] we define
P(pi,q)(Q) =

u if Q ∈ [0, piu−c + (n− 1)q]
pi
Q−(n−1)q + c if Q ∈ ( piu−c + (n− 1)q, b],
0 if Q > b.
The next Lemma characterizes equilibria in this family of inverse demand functions.
Lemma 1 For each pi ∈ (0, p¯i] and q ∈ [q(pi), b/n], q ∈ E(P(pi,q)) and Π(P(pi,q), q) = pi.
Proof. Given that P (nq) = pi/q + c, it is easy to verify that Π(P(pi,q), q) = pi if q is an equilibrium
of P(pi,q). To see the latter, denote with P
R
(pi,q)(qi, q−i) the residual demand faced by firm i under
demand P(pi,q), with q−i representing the total quantity produced by firms other than i. Observe
that for q−i = (n− 1)q we have
PR(pi,q)(qi, (n− 1)q) =

u if qi ∈ [0, piu−c ]
pi
qi
+ c if qi ∈ ( piu−c , b− (n− 1)q],
0 if qi > b− (n− 1)q.
It follows firm i is indifferent among any quantity in the interval [pi/(u− c), b− (n− 1)q], as they
all provide profit pi. To conclude the proof, observe that i’s profit is zero for qi > b− (n− 1)q and
it is qi(u− c) ≤ pi for qi ≤ piu−c .
As explicitly showed in the proof of the Lemma above, the demand function P(pi,q) exhibits
unit-elasticity of the residual demand for quantities in (pi/(u−c), b− (n−1)q), when all other firms
supply q. In particular, for each individual firm, producing any quantity in (pi/(u− c), b− (n−1)q)
is a best reply to the other firms producing q and generates profit pi.
Figure 1 illustrates the geometry of the demand functions in the class above, for the case
where u = b = 1 and c = 0. The first panel depicts two demand functions, P(pi,pi) and P(pi,1/n),
5Following McManus (1964), a symmetric equilibrium exists under the stated assumptions.Equilibria may exists
even for unbounded demand. However, no bound can be placed on market outcomes if the demand can be unbounded
and no further restriction is imposed, as we shall show toward the end of the next section.
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that generate the same profit but induce two different equilibrium quantities, the minimal and the
maximal. The dotted curve shows P(pi,q) as equilibrium q varies in [pi, 1/n]. The second sub-figure
depicts two demand functions, P(pi,1/n) and P(pi′,1/n), that generates different profit levels but induce
the same equilibrium quantity. Observe that demands are fully ordered along both dimension pi
and q. The following useful Lemma is immediate to verify and we state it without proof.
Lemma 2 P(pi′,q) ≥ P(pi,q) if p¯i ≥ pi′ ≥ pi ≥ 0 and P(pi,q′) ≥ P(pi,q) if b/n ≥ q′ ≥ q ≥ q(pi).
The next result shows that any demand function that has an equilibrium q and generates
individual profit level pi is dominated by F(pi,q) pointwise and that the equilibrium q of P(pi,q) achieves
the largest consumer surplus among symmetric equilibria q of demands in P if pi is equilibrium profit.
Lemma 3 If P ∈ P and q ∈ E(P ) and Π(P, q) = pi then P ≤ P(pi,q), and CS(P(pi,q), q) ≥ CS(P, q).6
When n = 1 the result is analogous to Lemma 1 in Condorelli and Szentes (2020), which is
here generalized beyond the monopoly case.
Proof. First observe that if q is a Cournot equilibrium under P , then for any x ≥ 0,
pi ≥ x [P (x+ (n− 1)q)− c] .
By denoting Q = x+ (n− 1)q and rearranging, it follows that, for Q ∈ [(n− 1)q,+∞),
P (Q) ≤ pi
Q− (n− 1)q + c.
Next, we show that P (Q) ≤ P(pi,q)(Q) for Q ≥ 0. This follows from the inequality above for
Q ≥ (n − 1)q. For Q < (n − 1)q ≤ (n − 1)q + pi/(u − c) the inequality follows from the fact that
P(pi,q)(Q) = u in that range, while P (Q) ≤ u by assumption.
We now establish that P(pi,q) generates (weakly) larger consumer surplus than P . In particular
CS(P(pi,q), q)− CS(P, q) =
∫ nq
0
(P(pi,q)(x)− P (x))dx ≥ 0,
because P(pi,q) ≥ P by the first part of the proposition.
For each pi ∈ (0, p¯i], define the inverse demand function Ppi = P(pi,b/n). In the symmetric
equilibrium of this demand, all b consumers are served. The following Lemma establishes that
there exists no symmetric equilibrium of any demand function generating individual firm profit pi
that attains a higher consumer surplus than the equilibrium b/n of Ppi.
Lemma 4 For any P ∈ P and q ∈ E(P ) with Π(P, q) = pi, we have CS(Ppi, b/n) ≥ CS(P, q).7
6Note that, being both decreasing and left-continuous, unless P = P(pi,q), P and P(pi,q) will differ on a non-zero
measure of the domain [0, b/n].
7This result also illustrate that no absolute bound can be placed on the ratio of consumer to producer surplus. In
fact, lim
pi→0
CS(Ppi, b/n)/pi =∞ and lim
pi→p¯i
CS(Ppi, b/n)/pi = 0.
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Figure 1: Examples of demands P(pi,q) for b = u = 1 and c = 0
price
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P(π,1/n)
P(π, π)
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1
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Proof. Lemma 1 establishes that b/n is an equilibrium of Ppi and q is an equilibrium of P(pi,q).
Lemma 3 establishes that CS(P(pi,q), q) ≥ CS(P, q). To see that CS(Ppi, b/n) ≥ CS(P(pi,q), q) recall
the last equation of the Lemma 3 and observe that b/n ≥ q and, for each pi ∈ [0, p¯i] and q, q′ such
that pi/(u− c) ≤ q′ ≤ q ≤ b/n, we have P(pi,q′)(Q) ≤ P(pi,q)(Q) for Q ∈ [0,∞), by Lemma 2.
We are now in a position to state the main result of this section, which characterizes all
couples of consumer and producer surplus that can arise for some demand function in P.
Proposition 1 There exists P ∈ P and q ∈ E(P ) such that Π(P, q) = pi, CS(P, q) = w if and only
if (pi,w) ∈ {(x, y) : x ∈ (0, p¯i], y ∈ [0, CS(Px, b/n))}.
Proof. The only-if part is obvious in light of Lemma 4. That is, there can’t be any equilibrium
payoff couple outside the specified set. To prove the if-part consider P(pi,q) and observe that, for
each pi ∈ (0, b(u− c)), q is an equilibrium in light of Lemma 1 and CS(P(pi,q), q) is continuous and
strictly increasing in q, and CS(P(pi,q), q) = 0.
Contour lines for the sets of feasible combinations of consumer surplus, CS, and (total in-
dustry) profit are illustrated in the next figure 2 for n = 1, 2, 5, assuming b = u = 1 and c = 0
(i.e., limc↓0). As it is apparent from the picture, the set of feasible producer/consumer surplus
combinations expand as n grows and the market becomes more competitive. Equilibrium alone
imposes very little restrictions on how the surplus is shared in an oligopolistic market populated
by a large number of identical firms with constant marginal cost.
Figure 2: Achievable profit and surplus couples in P (b = u = 1, c = 0)
n=2
n=1
n=5
Profit
CS
CS
CS
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
In light of Lemma 4, finding an inverse demand function in P and an equilibrium that
maximizes consumer surplus in a Cournot market with n firms and marginal cost c is equivalent
to maximizing CS(Ppi, b/n) in pi ∈ (0, p¯i).
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Corollary 1 Let pi∗ = p¯ien , then CS(Ppi∗ , b/n) = p¯i(n−1)+pi∗ ≥ CS(P, q) for any P ∈ P, q ∈ E(P ).
Proof.
max
pi∈(0,p¯i)
CS(Ppi, b/n) = max
pi∈[0,p¯i]
∫ b
0
(Ppi(x)− c) dx− npi =
= max
pi∈[0,p¯i]
[∫ pi/(u−c)+(n−1)b/n
0
u dx+
∫ b
pi/(u−c)+(n−1)b/n
pi
x− b(n− 1)/n + c dx− npi − bc
]
=
= max
pi∈[0,p¯i]
[
pi
(
1− n− log
(pi
p¯i
))
+ p¯i(n− 1)
]
.
The objective function above is strictly concave and it is routine to verify that setting pi = pi∗ solves
the stated maximization problem.
At the consumer-optimal equilibrium, individual firm’s profit is pi∗ (while total industry profit
is npi∗), consumer surplus is p¯i(n− 1) + pi∗, the price is c+ npi∗/b and the total demand is b. There
is no efficiency loss arising from pricing above marginal cost.
Before concluding this section with an example, we observe that lim
p¯i→∞
pi∗ = ∞. Therefore,
as we claimed without proof in footnote 5, if there is no bound on either maximal demand b or
maximal valuation u, then no bounds can be placed on consumer and producer surplus either.
Example 1 The price level for the equilibrium under the consumer optimal demand for u = b = 1,
c = 0 is e−n, while the price level for equilibrium under the standard linear inverse demand curve
P (Q) = 1−Q is 1n+1 . The price decreases much faster in the optimal demand curve as opposed to
the linear demand, as the number of firms grows. For instance, at n = 4 the market price is 0.20
under the linear demand curve while it is approximately 0.02 for Ppi∗. On the other hand, quantity
is always 1 in the optimal demand while it is n/(n+ 1) in the linear demand.
4 Bounding Consumer, Producer Surplus and Dead-weight Loss
The aim of this section is to provide a complete characterization of all possible couples of con-
sumer and producer surplus for any given level of the first-best surplus available given demand and
production cost.
We define the first-best surplus under demand P , and denote it FB(P ), as usual omitting
reference to cost, as the consumer surplus that is attained when the quantity supplied is such that
exactly all consumers with valuation above the cost are served. More formally, for each demand
P ∈ P, we define
FB(P ) =
∫ bˆ(P )
0
P (x)dx− bˆ(P )c,
where bˆ(P ) = max{q : P (q) ≥ c} and is well-defined because P is left-continuous and u > c. Hence,
again omitting reference to c, for s ∈ (0, np¯i] define the set Ps = {P ∈ P : FB(P ) = s} . Note that
FB(P ) ≤ b(u− c) = np¯i for P ∈ P. Hence 0 ≤ s ≤ np¯i.
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Next, observe that, for each pi ∈ [0, p¯i],
FB(Ppi) = CS(Ppi, b/n) + nΠ(Ppi, b/n) = pi
[
1− log
(
npi
b(u− c)
)]
+ (n− 1)p¯i,
where the first equality follows because bˆ(Ppi) = b given that Ppi(b) = c + npi/b > c. Then,
observe that FB(Ppi) is continuous and strictly increasing in pi and that FB(P0) = (n− 1)p¯i while
FB(Pp¯i) = b(u− c) = np¯i.
Now, we define the profit level pis which, as it will be shown later, is the minimum profit that
is attainable when the demand is in Ps.
Definition 1 For s ∈ (0, (n− 1)p¯i] let pis = 0, for s ∈ ((n− 1)p¯i, np¯i] let pis solve s = FB(Ppis).8
In fact, our first result in this section shows that the symmetric equilibrium b/n under Ppis =
P(pis,b/n) minimizes individual profit among all symmetric Cournot equilibria for inverse demands
in Ps. Since for s < (n− 1)p¯i, we have pis = 0 and P0 /∈ Ps, we abuse notation by defining, only for
s ∈ [0, (n− 1)p¯i]
Ppis(Q) =

sn
b(n−1) + c if Q ∈ [0, b(n− 1)/n]
c if Q ∈ (b(n− 1)/n, b],
0 if Q > b.
This guarantees that FB(Ppis) = s and that b/n is an equilibrium while Π(Ppis , b/n) = pis = 0.
Lemma 5 pis = Π(Ppis , b/n) ≤ Π(P, q) for any P ∈ Ps and q ∈ E(P )
Proof. The statement is obvious for s ∈ (0, (n − 1)p¯i] as in equilibrium pis = 0. Therefore, we
focus on s ∈ ((n − 1)p¯i, np¯i]. By way of contradiction, suppose an equilibrium q of some P ∈ Ps
generates individual profit pi′ such that pis > pi′. Then, consider that each firm producing b/n is an
equilibrium under Ppi′ . Furthermore, FB(Ppi′) ≥ FB(P ) given the definition of FB (note b/n ≥ q
and Ppi(b) > c) and the fact that Ppi′ = P(pi′,b/n) ≥ P(pi′,q) ≥ P by Lemma 2 (first inequality) and
Lemma 3 (second inequality). However, since FB(Ppi) is strictly increasing in pi, the assumption
that pis > pi
′ implies that s = FB(Ppis) > FB(Ppi′) ≥ FB(P ) = s, a contradiction.
It is a corollary of the previous Lemma that the equilibrium b/n of Ppis not only minimizes
producer surplus, but also maximizes consumer surplus among all equilibria for demands in Ps.
Corollary 2 s− npis = CS(Ppis , b/n) ≥ CS(P, q) for any P ∈ Ps and q ∈ E(P ).
Note that when n = 1 and s > 0 then pis > 0. Hence, as expected, in the monopoly case
there is no demand function that would let consumers extract the entire surplus s.
Proof. First, observe that the symmetric equilibrium of Ppis generates consumer surplus equal to
s− npis as the quantity supplied in total is equal to b. Then, by way of contradiction, assume that
there exists P ∈ Ps and a symmetric Cournot equilibrium of P that generate individual profit pi
8If b = u = 1 and c = 0, pis =
n−1−ns
nW−1(n−1−nse )
for s > n−1
n
. Here W−1 is the lower branch of the Lambert W
function. While it cannot be expressed in terms of elementary functions it is defined by W−1(xex) = x for x ≤ −1.
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and larger consumer surplus. Because, s−npi is an upper bound of the consumer surplus achievable
under P , our contradiction assumption implies that s−npi > s−npis, or, equivalently, that pi < pis,
which is in contradiction with the result of proposition 5.
Consider consumer surplus and industry profit, nΠ, in the positive quadrant of a Cartesian
plane and identify the total surplus s as a linear constraints that bounds their sum. See the dotted
line figure 5 for illustration. Call achievable set, the set of consumer surplus, producer surplus and
dead-weight loss triples that are achievable in some equilibrium of some demand in Ps. Clearly, any
achievable nΠ is such that npis ≤ nΠ ≤ s, while consumer surplus is bounded above by s−nΠ and
below by zero. We now characterize the upper contour line of the achievable set. More precisely,
we now show, that, for any s, any combination of producer and consumer surplus (npi, s − pi) for
pi ∈ [pis, s/n] can be achieved by some symmetric Cournot equilibrium of some demand in Ps.
Before doing so, we introduce a class of demand functions that will be used to prove further
results. For each pi ∈ (0, p¯i], q ∈ [q(pi), b/n] and k ∈ [q(pi) + (n− 1)q, nq] let,
P kpi,q(Q) =

P(pi,q)(k) if Q ∈ [0, k]
P(pi,q)(Q) if Q ∈ (k, b],
0 if Q > b.
This is a truncated version P(pi,q). of Because P
k
pi,q(Q) = P(pi,q)(Q) for Q ≥ k and k ≤ nq, light of
Lemma 1, it is immediate to see that P kpi,q has an equilibrium q that generates individual profit pi.
The next figure 3 depicts an example of a demand function P kpi,q for b = u = 1 and c = 0 and the
division of the first-best surplus between consumer surplus (CS), profits (npi) and deadweight loss
(DWL) in the q-equilibrium.
Figure 3: Example of a demands P kpi,q for b = u = 1 and c = 0
k
Pkπ,q
1
1
price
demand
P(π,q) (k)
P(π,q) (1)
nqπ+(n-1)q
DWLnπ
CS
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Proposition 2 For every pi ∈ [pis, s/n], there exists P ∈ Ps and q ∈ E(P ) such that Π(P, q) = pi
and CS(P, q) = s− npi.
The proof is constructive. For each surplus-profit combination identified in the statement,
an inverse demand P kpi,b/n ∈ Ps is explicitly constructed whose equilibrium b/n achieves them. Note
that since the equilibrium is b/n, there is no deadweight loss and CS(P kpi,b/n) + Π(P
k
pi,b/n) = s.
Proof. We focus on showing that for each s ∈ (0, np¯i] and pi ∈ (pis, s/n] there exists (unique)
k0(s, pi) such that FB(P k
0
pi,b/n) = s and therefore P
k0
pi,b/n ∈ Ps. The proof is concluded by noting that
for equilibria b/n of P k
0
pi,b/n, consumer surplus is equal to FB(P
k0
pi,b/n)− nΠ(P k
0
pi,b/n, b/n) = s− npi.
To show existence of k0(s, pi), fix s and observe first that P
pi/(u−c)+(n−1)b/n
pi,b/n = P(pi,b/n) =
Ppi. Then note that because pi > pis we must have FB(Ppi) > FB(Ppis) = s. Finally note that
FB(P bpi,b/n) = npi ≤ s because pi ≤ s/n. Since FB(P kpi,b/n) is continuous and strictly decreasing in
k in the specified parameter space, we reach our conclusion by the intermediate value theorem.
The result shows, roughly speaking, that there need not be an efficiency-equality trade-off
when the number of firms is sufficiently large. In particular, as long as each firm is guaranteed
pis, any division of the first best surplus between consumers and producers is attained by some
demand function without producing dead-weight loss, regardless of the number of firms in the
market. Furthermore, note that when the number of firms is sufficiently large, n > 1/(1− s), then
pis = 0 and so any surplus-profit combination that achieves the first best is attainable.
To complete our characterization, the next results determine, for each feasible (pi, s), the
minimum level of consumer surplus that can be achieved in the equilibrium of some demand in Ps,
and also establish that all intermediate levels of consumer surplus between the maximum and the
minimum can be achieved. Before proceeding, we need to introduce further notation.
Definition 2 Let pis ∈ [pis, s/n] be the solution to FB(P(pis,q(pis))) = s.9
To see that pis ≥ pis exists, note first that FB(P(pis,b/n)) = s and therefore FB(P(pis,q)) ≤ s, since
by Lemma 2 we have P(pis,q) ≤ P(pis,b/n) and P(pis,b/n) ≥ c. Second, note that FB(P(s/n,q)) ≥ s as
profit under P(s/n,q) is s/n and FB(P(s/n,q)) ≥ ns/n = s. Finally, observe that uniqueness follows
by the strict monotonicity of FB(P(pis,q)) in pi.
10
To complete the analysis we now scan over profit levels in [pis, s/n]. We consider two cases.
First, we look at profit levels in [pis, s/n] (Proposition 3) and, second, we look at profit levels in
[pis, pi
s] (Proposition 4). Before proceeding we find useful to define the deadweight loss generated
by an equilibrium q of some demand function P as DWL(P, q) = FB(P, q) − CS(P, q) − Π(P, q)
and to state some of its properties where the demand is of the type P kpi,q.
Lemma 6 DWL(P kpi,q, q) is continuous and strictly decreasing in q and independent of k.
Proof. Since k < nq for q ∈ [q, b/n] and P kpi,q(x) = P(pi,q)(x) for x ≥ nq ≥ pi/(u− c) + (n− 1)q, we
have DWL(P kpi,q, q) =
∫ b
nq(P
k
pi,q(x) − c)dx =
∫ b
nq(Ppi,q(x) − c)dx = pi [− log(q) + log(b− (n− 1)q)] .
See also figure 3 for a geometric intuition of the last part of the statement.
9It is worth emphasizing that pis may but need not be equal to pis and that q(pi) was defined just before Lemma 1.
10For b = u = 1 and c = 0 we have pis = s
(n−1)s−W−1(−se(n−1)s−n)
for s ≥ n−1
n
.
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Proposition 3 For every s ∈ (0, np¯i], pi ∈ [pis, s/n], and w ∈ [0, s − npi] there exists P ∈ Ps and
q ∈ E(P ) such that Π(P, q) = pi and CS(P, q) = w.11
The proposition shows that for given s and profit level pi above pis, any feasible combination
of consumer surplus and deadweight loss is achievable. The proof is, again, constructive. First,
it is showed that zero consumer surplus can be achieved in equilibrium when pi ∈ [pis, s/n] using
some demand Pnqpi,q for some q. Note that this demand induces zero consumer surplus as illustrated
in figure 4, where the equilibrium quantity is indicated with the black dot, the profit is the blue
shaded area while the dead-weight loss (DWL) is the gray shaded area. Then it is showed that
intermediate levels of consumer surplus are also achievable by demand functions in Ps.
Figure 4: Example of a demands Pnqpi,q for b = u = 1 and c = 0
nq
Pnqπ,q
1
1
price
demand
P(π,q) (nq)
P(π,q) (1)
π+(n-1)q
nπ
DWL
Proof. As a first step, for each s ∈ (0, (u − c)b] and pi ∈ [pis, s/n], we determine q such that
FB(Pnqpi,q) = s. Clearly, if such q exists, then in the equilibrium q of this demand function consumer
surplus is zero. In fact, it is immediate to verify that CS(Pnqpi,q, q) = 0 because P
nq
pi,q is constant
between 0 and the equilibrium total quantity nq (see Figure 4).
Hence, we show that for each s and pi in the range identified by the statement, there exists
q(pi) ≤ q ≤ b/n and demand Pnqpi,q such that FB(Pnqpi,q) = s. To see this, observe that Pnqpi,q = P(pi,q)
as pi/(u − c) + (n − 1)q = nq since q = pi/(u − c). Then note that FB(P(pi,q)) ≥ FB(P(pis,q)) = s,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 2 observing that pi ≥ pis and q(pi) ≥ q(pis), while the
equality follows from the definition of pis. Second, consider that FB(P bpi,b/n) = npi ≤ s because
P bpi,b/n(Q) = P(pi,b/n)(b) = npi/b+ c for Q ∈ [0, b] and pi ≤ s/n. The result that such a q exists, call
it q0(pi, s), follows from the intermediate value theorem by varying q in FB(Pnqpi,q) between q and b.
11This is a complete characterization as consumer surplus can only be in [0, s−npi] if profit is pi and first-best is s.
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To conclude the proof, we now show that, for pi ∈ [pis, s/n], all intermediate levels of consumer
surplus between 0 and s − npi can be achieved by some demand P kpi,q ∈ Ps. As a preliminary
step observe two facts: (i) DWL(Ppi,q0(pi,s), q
0(pi, s)) = s − npi because by the first part of this
proposition DWL(P
nq0(pi,s)
pi,q0(pi,s)
, q0(pi, s)) = s− n but deadweight loss of P kq does not depend on k (see
Lemma 6); (ii) DWL(Ppi,b/n, b/n) = 0 by definition. Then, since DWL(Ppi,q, q) is continuous and
decreasing in q (see 6), then for any x ∈ [0, s − npi] there exists qˆ such that DWL(Ppi,qˆ, qˆ) = x.
Then, since DWL(P kpi,q, q) does not depend on k (see Lemma 6) and since for any P we have
DWL(P, q) = FB(P )−CS(P, q)−nΠ(P, q), we can establish our result if for all q ∈ [q0(pi, s), b/n]
we find kq such that FB(P k
q
pi,q, q) = s. Existence of k
q (where dependence on s and pi is omitted to
simplify notation) is demonstrated in the remainder of the proof.
To see that for all q ≥ q0(pi, s) there exists kq such that nq ≥ kq ≥ nq0(pi, s) and FB(P kqpi,q) = s
we can use again the intermediate value theorem after observing the following two things. First,
FB(P
nq0(pi,s)
pi,q0(pi,s)
) = s ≤ FB(Pnq0(pi,s)pi,q ), for q ≥ q0(pi, s), because, for given k, by Lemma 2 P kpi,q ≥ P kpi,q0
for all q ≥ q0(pi, s). Second, that FB(Pnqpi,q) ≤ s for q ≥ q0(pi, s) because FB(Pnqpi,q) = npi +
DWL(Pnqpi,q) ≤ npi + DWL(Pnq
0(pi,s)
pi,q0(pi,s)
, q0(pi, s)) = FB(P
nq0(pi,s)
pi,q0(pi,s)
, q0(pi, s)) = s, where the inequality
follows since we have DWL(Pnqpi,q) ≤ DWL(Pnq
0(pi,s)
pi,q0(pi,s)
, q0(pi, s)) due to DWL(P kpi,q) being independent
of k and decreasing in q for given pi (see Lemma 6).
Observe that if n = 1, then pis = pi
s as P(pis,q) = P(pis,q′) for any pi ≤ q ≤ b/n and so
FB(P(pi,q)) = FB(P(pis,b/n)) = FB(Ppis). Hence, the above result completes the characterization of
the n = 1 monopoly case. In this specific case, for any given s and pi ∈ [pis, s/n], all surplus and
deadweight loss combinations are achieved as different equilibria of the demand Ppi. In particular,
the highest consumer surplus s−npi is achieved by the equilibrium b/n (see Condorelli and Szentes
(2020)) and the lowest, equal to 0, by q(pi) = pi/(u − c) (see Kremer and Snyder (2018)), while
all intermediate levels are achieved by equilibria where quantity ranges from q(pi) to b/n. The
achievable set is a triangle characterized by the following three (industry profit, consumer surplus)
points: (npis, s− npis), (s, 0) and (npis, 0). See the first column of figure 5 for an illustration.
To achieve the goal of this section, we still need to characterize possible levels of consumer
surplus given pi ∈ (pis, pis]. A last piece of notation is needed for the next and last result.
Definition 3 For pi ∈ [pis, pis], let qˆ(pi, s) solve FB(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s))) = s.
Note that FB(P(pis,q)) = s. Hence, by Lemma 2, for pi ≤ pis we have FB(P(pi,q)) ≤ s given that also
q(pi) ≤ q(pis). Then there must exist qˆ(pi, s) such that FB(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s))) = s. This is the case because
FB(P(pi,b/n)) = FB(Ppi) ≥ FB(Ppis) = s and FB(P(pi,q)) is continuous and increasing in q.
Proposition 4 For s ∈ (0, np¯i] and pi ∈ [pis, pis], there exists P ∈ Ps and q ∈ E(P ) such that
Π(P, q) = pi and CS(P, q) = w if and only if w ∈ [CS(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)), s− npi].
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction P ∈ Ps and an equilibrium q of P exists such that
Π(P, q) = pi ∈ [pis, pis] and CS(P, q) < CS(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)).
There are three possibilities, either q < qˆ(pi, s) or q = qˆ(pi, s) or q > qˆ(pi, s). First, suppose
q < qˆ(pi, s) and note that since we must have P ≤ P(pi,q) < P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), where the first inequality
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follows by Lemma 3 and the second from Lemma 2. Recalling the definition of FB at the beginning
of this section we must have FB(P ) ≤ FB(P(pi,q)) < FB(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s))) = s, which contradicts P ∈ Ps.
Second, if q = qˆ(pi, s) then P(pi,q) = P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)). Hence, either P = P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)) and therefore
CS(P, q) = CS(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)), a contradiction, or P < P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)) in an interval with positive
mass which gives FB(P ) < FB(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s))) = s, also a contradiction.
Third, suppose that q > qˆ(pi, s). Observe Lemma 3 implies P ≤ P(pi,q) and therefore
DWL(P, q) =
∫ bˆ(P )
nq
(P (x)−c)dx ≤
∫ bˆ(P )
nq
(P(pi,q)(x)−c)dx+
∫ b
bˆ(P )
(P(pi,q)(x)−c)dx = DWL(P(pi,q), q),
where the second inequality follows because P ≤ P(pi,q) and Ppi,q(Q) ≥ c for Q ∈ [bˆ(P ), b]. Then,
recall from Lemma 6 that DWL(P(pi,x), x) is strictly decreasing in x and conclude that, because
q > qˆ(pi, s), we must have
DWL(P, q) ≤ DWL(P(pi,q), q) ≤ DWL(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)).
To find a contradiction with the hypothesis that equilibrium q of P generates lower consumer
surplus it is then sufficient to observe that
CS(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)) = s− npi −DWL(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)) ≤ s− npi −DWL(P, q) = CS(P, q).
The proof that intermediate levels of consumer surplus can be attained is analogous to the
one presented in the previous proposition. In particular, DWL(P(pi,q), q) is continuous, strictly
decreasing (by Lemma 6) and goes from s−npi−CS(P(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)) to 0 as x goes from qˆ(pi, s) to
b/n. Hence, because DWL(P kpi,q) = DWL(P(pi,q), q) for any k (also by Lemma 6) and CS(P
k
pi,q, q) =
s − npi −DWL(P kpi,q, q) we can conclude the proof if, for all pi ∈ [pis, pis], we can find kq such that
FB(P kpi,q) = s for all q ∈ [qˆ(pi, s), b/n]. Details are omitted.
To summarize, figure 5 fixes the maximum valuation and the maximum demand to one and
the cost to zero and illustrates the achievable couples of industry profit and consumer surplus for
various levels of first-best surplus and number of firms in the market. Note that, as expected,
qˆ(pis, s) = pis/(u− c) and therefore CS(P(pis,qˆ(pis,s)), qˆ(pis, s)) = 0. On the other hand qˆ(pis, s) = b/n
and therefore CS(P(pis,qˆ(pis,s)), qˆ(pis, s)) = CS(Ppis , b/n) = s− npis. That is, as long as pis > pis (see
columns 2 and 3 of figure 5), there is a unique consumer surplus level achievable at the minimal
profit pis and the equilibrium is efficient (see columns 2 and 3 of figure 5).
As it can be inferred from figure 5, as the number of firms grows,then pis → 0 and pis → s/n
and, more importantly, the minimum level of achievable consumer surplus given pi increases toward
s− npi. This visual insight is confirmed by the following results, which shows that as the number
of firms gets large only the Pareto frontier remains in the achievable set.
Corollary 3
lim
n→∞npis = 0, limn→∞npi
s = s and lim
n→∞CS(F(pi,qˆ(pi,s)), qˆ(pi, s)) = s− npi for all 0 ≤ pi ≤ s/n.
This confirms conventional wisdom in the Cournot model that inefficiency (but not necessarily
profits) disappear as competition increases.
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Figure 5: Achievable (nΠ, CS) couples in Ps within blue lines, b = u = 1 and c = 0
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Appendix A
We show that if there exists an asymmetric Cournot equilibrium, then there also exists a symmetric
equilibrium where the total amount produced, and therefore industry profit, is the same. We
illustrate this for the case of two firms, but the argument extends easily to multiple firms.
Suppose there exists equilibrium (q1, q2) with Q = q1 + q2. The following inequalities hold:
q1[P (Q)− c] ≥ q′[P (q′ + q2)− c] ∀q′
q2[P (Q)− c] ≥ q′′[P (q′′ + q1)− c] ∀q′′.
Now substitute q′ = Q/2− q2 + qˆ and q′′ = Q/2− q1 + ˆˆq. We can rewrite the above inequalities as
q1[P (Q)− c] ≥ (Q/2− q2 + qˆ)[P (Q/2 + qˆ)− c] ∀qˆ
q2[P (Q)− c] ≥ (Q/2− q1 + ˆˆq)[P (Q/2 + ˆˆq)− c] ∀ˆˆq.
Summing up the two sets of inequalities we know the following must hold
Q[P (Q)− c] ≥ (Q/2− q2 + qˆ)[P (Q/2 + qˆ)− c] + (Q/2− q1 + ˆˆq)[P (Q/2 + ˆˆq)− c] ∀qˆ, ˆˆq.
Since the above must hold for all qˆ, ˆˆq, fix qˆ = ˆˆq. The set of inequalities below must also hold
Q[P (Q)− c] ≥ (Q/2− q2 + qˆ +Q/2− q1 + qˆ)[P (Q/2 + qˆ)− c] ∀qˆ.
Finally, noting that q1 + q2 = Q and dividing by two we get
Q/2[P (Q)− c] ≥ qˆ[P (Q/2 + qˆ)− c] ∀qˆ
which implies that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where both firms produce quantity Q/2.
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